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Against the background of a crisis of elder care in Germany, this article examines the expansion of 
informal elder care work in terms of exploitation. A concept of indirect exploitation is used that 
takes into account the special characteristics of highly feminised elder care work and Germany’s 
elder care market. The article shows, through an empirical qualitative case study, that Germany’s 
elder care regime is maintained through the politically supported exploitation of socially vulnerable 









Relatives administer tube feeds, a former nursery school teacher sets injections as a “volunteer 
dementia assistant”, unskilled assistants wash patients requiring intensive care and a Bulgarian 
dressmaker engages in unpaid night watches for months to prevent a woman with dementia from 
running away – what is going on in Germany’s elder care regime? These examples are taken from 
the empirical findings of a study guided by the following question: How does it come about that 
more and more laypersons perform elder care work for which they are neither qualified nor 
adequately paid? The study was based on the observation that, under the pressure of increasing 
demands, a shortage of skilled labour and cost-saving measures, there has been increased political 
support for informal elder care performed by four specific groups: relatives, volunteers, 
unemployed low-skilled persons and migrant care workers.  
In Germany, the number of elderly dependents is predicted to rise to 3.4 million by 2030, with 
506 000 professional care workers needed (Prognos, 2012). One way to meet this rising demand 
would be to increase formal professionalised elder care, including upgrading existing low-paid care 
work. However, the German welfare state does not provide sufficient security and continues to 
rely on low wages in the elder care sector. In this context, the supply of qualified elder care workers 
is not keeping up with the increasing demand. In response, informal elder care that deviates from 
the standards of formally paid and regulated care work, has received political support since the 
1990s. This has to do with the specific features of Germany’s elder care regime. This regime can 
be called “family-based” because it delegates most of its elder care obligations to families, and, due 
to traditional gender-specific divisions of care work, particularly to women. Thus, it is largely based 
on informal and unpaid elder care work done by female relatives who are still Germany’s most 
numerous and cheapest care providers. However, this care regime has run into difficulty, as unpaid 
female care work is becoming scarcer at precisely the time that the elder care burden is increasing. 
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Rising female employment and the requirements of workplace flexibility as well as changed 
household and family structures lead to shrinking elder care potentials in many families. In an 
ageing capitalist society, elder care policy now tries to meet these challenges through the continuation 
of a cost-saving care regime under changing conditions of social reproduction. Under the heading of 
so-called “caring communities”, supply gaps have triggered an intense socio-political search for the 
“dormant potentials” of cheap informal lay care beyond the family. In order to use informal care 
potentials, the government has attempted to fill the gaps by setting up cash-for-care programmes 
for families, strengthening volunteer care work, creating workfare programmes for unemployed 
and low-skilled workers, and legalising domestic care work done by migrants. All these groups have 
something in common: They are socially vulnerable and generate little or no personnel costs. Based 
on the study, the central thesis of this article is that the mobilisation and utilisation of informal 
elder care work can best be described as an exploitative political strategy because certain actors take 
advantage by appropriating the labour power of socially vulnerable caregivers in order to reduce 
rising reproduction costs.  
The term exploitation refers to a specific causal nexus between two actors. As Erik Olin 
Wright (1997: 10) puts it, “the core of the concept revolves around a particular type of antagonistic 
interdependency of material interests”. Accordingly, one actor exploits another if he or she can 
generate advantages at the other person’s expense by appropriating their labour efforts. 
Exploitation is thus understood here as a process in which certain actors are able, under certain 
conditions, to use the (care-)working capacity of socially vulnerable actors to lower the costs of the 
reproduction of labour. Employers derive monetary benefits from the use of unskilled and 
informally working lay caregivers. They benefit from low contributions to long-term care insurance, 
which can be kept at a low level because a large proportion of care work is informal and unpaid. 
To put it in Marxist terms, comparable with the production of “relative surplus-value” (Marx, 1887: 
219ff.), the use of informal elder care work reduces reproduction costs, thereby lowering the value 
of labour power and wages, and thus helping to appropriate more surplus to increase profit margins 
proportionally. Furthermore, providers of outpatient and inpatient care can also use the 
deployment of informal care workers to maintain their care provision under conditions of high 
cost pressure and a shortage of skilled care workers. By expanding informal lay care, the state also 
benefits from keeping care costs low to secure competitive advantages. What distinguishes this 
exploitation from Marx’s concept of exploitation, is that 1) no formal wage labour is exploited, but 
2) “unproductive” informal care work is predominantly performed in private households, and it is 
3) not aimed directly at generating profits. Instead, it can be described as “indirect exploitation” 
because it aims to lower reproduction costs in order to indirectly maximise profits and to ensure 
the maintenance of an elder care regime oriented towards cost reduction even in times of rising 
demand.  
By using the notion of exploitation, which has long since disappeared from German social 
sciences, the study takes an unconventional perspective. The notion of exploitation can help us to 
analyse the socio-politically driven use of informal elder care in at least two ways: First, it highlights 
the contemporary but hardly explored issue of national care policy from a critical perspective and 
identifies the structural causes, mechanisms and beneficiaries of a specific use of elder care work. 
Second, it explores the meaning of a core notion of Marxian theory by placing it in a rather unusual 
context. By doing so, it tries to extend the notion of exploitation beyond the traditional scope of 
paid employment and direct profit generation in order to understand the importance of unpaid 
care work for contemporary ageing capitalist societies.  
The article is structured as follows: The next section discusses the situation of elder care in 
Germany in more detail. The following sections then present an analytical framework which can 
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be used to investigate the exploitation of informal care work, using Marxist and Marxist–Feminist 
arguments. Thereafter, the core findings of a study on the causes, mechanisms, sufferers and 
beneficiaries of the exploitation of informal lay care in Germany are presented and analysed. 
Finally, the paper concludes by diagnosing a “cascaded” exploitation of informal elder care. 
 
 
The “Double Privatisation” of Elder Care  
In Germany, rising employment rates of women and rising elder care demands have been 
accompanied by a process of “double privatisation” since the 1990s (Biesecker et al., 2007). On the 
one side, privatisation appears in the guise of an ongoing growth of formal and commercial elder 
care services. Long-term care insurance has opened elder care to the market and thus initiated this 
process of privatisation. But commodification is only one side of the coin. On the other side, a 
second privatisation process takes place through an increasing shift of informal elder care back to 
private households and civil society. On the level of socio-political discourse, this is promoted by 
the concept of “caring communities”, which aims at the greater involvement of civil society in elder 
care. According to this model, in times of increasing care requirements, a greater proportion of 
elder care should be distributed to communities as part of a “welfare mix” of professional, family 
and voluntary assistance (Powell, 2007). However, the mobilisation of informal elder care does not 
stop with voluntary care work. In order to meet the growing need for elder care, low-skilled and 
informal employment segments are being expanded, too. Thus, both unpaid informal and paid 
informal elder care work are politically promoted.  
Informality is a relational concept that is always constituted vis-à-vis the socially valid norm 
of formally regulated wage labour and characterised by extra-legal regulation (Mayer-Ahuja, 2012: 
291f.). The informalisation of work means deregulated employment norms or arrangements that 
deviate from the standards of formal work. In that regard, informal elder care can be care work 
without a contractual basis or an arrangement in which contractual regulations are violated.  
With regard to the “double privatisation”, we can distinguish two different sectors of informal 
elder care work in Germany, which are both politically strengthened: In “sector 1” – paid inpatient 
and outpatient care – the norm of formally regulated care work is undermined by the informal use 
of unskilled auxiliary staff and so-called “additional personal assistants”. The latter are subsidised 
by the state and paid by the long-term care insurance fund rather than by private employers. These 
workers are trained in fast-track procedures and are officially used in overburdened inpatient and 
outpatient facilities for the care of dementia patients. However, they often perform care activities 
for which they are neither qualified nor paid. In addition, this category of paid informal elder care 
also includes migrant care workers whose labour in private households is promoted with the help 
of active policies by the state and whose labour rights are respected neither by placement agencies 
nor private employer households.  
In “sector 2” – unpaid domestic care provision – there is not a weakening of regulated labour 
standards. State policy interventions aim, on the one hand, at the continuation of family care1 and, 
on the other hand, the inclusion of non-family, in-house support by volunteers. Training courses 
are available for volunteers, financed by the long-term care insurance fund; they receive an expense 
 
 
1 For example, the state restricts access to residential care facilities. These interventions have been very 
successful: In 2017, about three-quarters of all patients (76 per cent or 2.59 million) were provided with 
informal home care by relatives only (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2018). 
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allowance of between 5 and 10 Euros an hour. No employment contracts apply in this sector, and 
the legal regulations that prohibit elder care activities for volunteers are often disregarded without 
sanction. So, these volunteers often take over care tasks for which they are not qualified.2  
It is no coincidence that both sectors are currently being expanded: Despite all the differences 
between paid and unpaid elder care work considered here, both sectors are informal and do not 
aim at directly generating profits. The informal use of labour is characterised by a disregard for 
labour law regulations (such as qualification and wage standards). Thus, it is especially suitable for 
keeping down rising reproduction costs in the context of demographic change and the shortage of 




Exploitation in a Welfare Market 
In order to empirically investigate the exploitative use of informal elder care workers, a concept of 
exploitation is needed. Additionally, the study would have to show a) why these population groups 
are exploited, b) which mechanisms do this, and c) to whose advantage it is. This is challenging, as 
the concept of exploitation is still associated with the explanation of direct (often industrial 
capitalist) profit generation. Using informal elder care work as an example introduces some 
challenges that are related to the special features of elder care in Germany.  
First, care work cannot mainly be defined as “productive” labour according to a Marxian 
understanding. In comparison to the production of commodities, it has only limited profitability, 
as do all personal services due to their labour content – that is, the “human element [is] not readily 
replaceable by machines” (Baumol, 2012: 19). Even if it could be considered productive in a 
Marxian sense when it is done as formal and rationalised wage labour in private care groups that 
aims at the generation of profits (which is not the focus here), it has only limited profitability 
compared to other economic sectors. Above all, in Germany it is predominantly performed 
informally without pay in private households. But this fact is at least indirectly related to reasons of 
profit generation: By allowing the majority of elder care work to be performed informally, unpaid 
or underpaid, the German care regime reduces reproduction costs in an ageing society. 
Second, elder care is performed in very special markets. The German market for elder care is 
a highly state-regulated “quasi-” or welfare market3 in which prices are determined by a specific 
downward cost pressure on wages and household incomes, induced by public long-term care 
insurance. With the introduction of long-term care insurance in 1995, not only was a market for 
elder care created but a budget principle was introduced. This was a novelty for the long tradition 
of fully comprehensive social insurance in Germany. Due to political pressure from employers, the 
insurance was introduced as only partial coverage with a low contribution rate. Thus, the insurance 
creates a specific cost pressure that determines the financial volume for insurance benefits and 
wages in advance. And these limits are significant: While the contribution rate for health insurance 
paid by employers and employees is 14.6 per cent, the rate for long-term care insurance is only 3.05 
 
 
2 Volunteering in elder care is becoming increasingly qualified, and there are legal regulations prohibiting 
volunteers from carrying out special elder care activities (such as wound care). However, these regulations 
are often not observed in private households, and are not checked. 
3 By using the term welfare market, it is not claimed here that the rules of capitalist accumulation are 
suspended. Nevertheless, it is not only the logic of capitalist markets that governs here but also the logic of 
state-regulated welfare production (Bartlett, Roberts and Le Grand, 1998). 
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per cent. Since then, the basis for remuneration for elder care services has been provided by 
restricted financial rates for inpatient care and so-called “point values” for outpatient care. These 
are negotiated between providers and insurance funds; they define the range of possible wage 
payments to care staff, and limit the purchasing power of households. As for other welfare markets, 
it can therefore apply that “consumer purchasing power is not expressed in money terms. Instead, 
it takes the form of an earmarked budget or ‘voucher’ confined to the purchase of a specific 
service” (Le Grand, 1991: 1260). Thus, low insurance benefits force private households to use the 
cheapest possible care providers, which in turn counters cost pressure through wage savings. The 
elder care market also differs from other markets because many small-scale care providers, such as 
the care services examined here, do not exist primarily to generate profits. Instead, their aim is to 
remain in the black under the high cost pressure. Thus, low wages in the elder care sector often do 
not result from cost-cutting imperatives for the purpose of maximising profits but from limited 
public funds.  
Finally, elder care in Germany is still regarded a “semi-profession” (Etzioni, 1969) or a “Jane 
Doe job” for which one does not need any proper qualification, but only “female virtues” such as 
helpfulness and empathy. This feminisation refers to both unpaid domestic elder care work, which 
is considered a natural labour of love, and paid elder care, where wages and social recognition are 
low. 
It follows that we are dealing here with forms of indirect exploitation. In the cases studied, it is 
not exploitation for the purpose of direct profit generation. However, by appropriating informal 
unpaid or (through the violation of labour regulations) underpaid elder care work, the costs of 
reproduction are kept low. We thus need a concept of exploitation that, regarding the cases 
examined here, first, should not depend upon assumptions about the direct creation of profits, and 
second, takes the identity and the similarities between the population groups addressed by care 
policy into account. In order to meet these requirements, Erik Olin Wright’s concept of 
exploitation as well as terms and arguments from the Marxist–Feminist domestic labour debate 
will be now taken up.  
 
 
Marx’s Blind Spots and the Exploitation of Unpaid Care Work  
According to Marx, profit is solely rooted in the specific feature of labour power to produce more 
value than is necessary for its reproduction. In addition, only “productive” labour, as a source of 
surplus value and profit, is considered to be capitalistically exploited. And this brings us to three 
problems that Marx’s notion of exploitation poses for our analysis. First, Marx did not reflect at all 
upon the exploitation of (unpaid) care work. He equated the reproduction of labour power with 
the production of the goods consumed by the workforce. When writing about the “given quantity 
of the means of subsistence” (Marx, 1887: 121), he did not mention unpaid reproductive work 
(such as, the preparation of purchased foods).4 Second, he treated labour as average labour 
regardless of gender and skill. This assumption obscures a highly gender-segregated labour market 
and gender-based discrimination, which needs to be especially considered within the field of care 
work. Although Marx condemned patriarchal relations, he “left the question of gender un-
 
 
4 Silvia Federici (2009: 292) also wrote that elder care marks the limits of Marxism: As reproductive work, 
it is not only unrecognised as work, but, in contrast to the reproduction of “productive” labour, it is also 
considered a value-absorbing activity. 
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theorized partly because ‘women’s emancipation’ had a peripheral importance in his political work, 
… and … he idealized industrial labour as the normative form of social production and a potential 
leveler of social inequalities” (Federici, 2017: 20). Finally, Marx’s perspective, which “focuses 
attention on capital’s exploitation of wage labor in commodity production”, is problematic due to 
its marginalisation of informal, unfree and illegal use of labour which he tended to regard as 
outdated forms of pre-capitalist exploitation (Fraser, 2016: 165).  
But what we can derive from Marx is that care work is always in crisis in capitalist societies 
due to its “unproductive” character, and although capitalist exploitation often looks like a free and 
fair exchange, it is always based on power and exclusion. To put it sociologically: For Marx, social 
vulnerability through social exclusion marks the precondition of exploitation in all class societies.  
Since Marx did not reflect upon the importance of informal paid and unpaid care work for 
the reproduction of labour power, he thus failed to integrate the possibility of the exploitation of 
“unproductive” or even uncommodified care work. These shortcomings were controversially 
discussed in the 1970s within the feminist domestic labour debate, without which thinking about 
the capitalist exploitation of care work would be impossible. The significance of the debate for the 
present analysis lies foremost in its critique of economic reductionism and the use of Marx’ notion 
of exploitation for unpaid domestic work. Since the nineteenth century, the socio-historical 
background of the debate was the nuclear family, traditionally composed of a paid male 
breadwinner and an unpaid housewife. German feminists Gisela Bock and Barbara Duden (1977) 
deciphered this institution as a genuinely capitalist form of organisation of the (re)production of 
(mostly male) labour power. Accordingly, unpaid domestic care work allows for the (re)production 
of labour power such that capital accumulation can satisfy demands for higher wages through the 
family wage, and thus enables an institution that relatively lowers the wage of the male breadwinner. 
Reproductive labour is an invisible part of the value of labour power and thus of profits. Without 
unpaid domestic labour, the value of labour power would be higher and this in turn would affect 
profits. Furthermore, the exploitation of free labour is thus comparatively more intensive than if 
domestic labour was commodified. Given these conclusions, it is conceivable that even unpaid 
work can be considered capitalistically exploitable, at least indirectly.  
Feminist criticism delivered two major insights on exploitation relevant to our investigation. 
First, the hypothesis that capitalist exploitation can occur even when neither “productive work” 
nor work contracts nor remuneration exist led to a conceptual broadening of the notion of 
exploitation that untied it from the link to direct forms of profit generation. Furthermore, in the 
domestic labour debate, this indirect form of exploitation is aimed at the reproduction of usable labour 
power free of charge for capital. In the case of elder care, we need to rethink because elder care 
does not aim at the direct reproduction of usable labour power. Persons in need of elder care no 
longer constitute usable labour power. However, by carrying out elder care work mainly informally 
and cost-effectively, the reproduction costs of the workforce can be kept low. Without this 
informal care work, the contributions to long-term care insurance and thus the value of labour 
power would be much higher. To sum up, unpaid elder care as “unproductive” work does not itself 
generate profits. But instead of disregarding the exploitation of care work, feminists recognised the 
importance of unpaid care work for the lowering of reproduction costs and the resulting indirect 
contribution to profit generation. 
Second, Marxist–Feminists take seriously the importance of sexist and racist discriminatory 
practices and the persistence of gender- and race-based oppression as “distinctly non-functionalist” 
and economically relevant factors. This “relationship between exploitation and oppression” 
(Bhattacharya, 2017: 3) – that is, the devaluation of feminised care work and its exploitative 
appropriation – is therefore possible because it is still considered a natural free resource or a “Jane 
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Doe job” for which one does not need proper qualifications. 
Related to the first insight, we can borrow a term from the domestic labour debate that 
addresses the indirect form of profit generation through the devaluation of reproduction costs. 
Rainer Bauböck (1988: 17f) grasped this as “depreciation” (Wertminderung, author’s own 
translation). With the expansion of domestic work, capital is therefore able to indirectly reduce the 
value of labour power. Accordingly, domestic work is not a commodified labour activity and the 
specific “surplus” is not a positive quantity but a negative difference. “Depreciation” marks this 
negative difference and is a term that can be utilised in the sphere of informal elder care work, too. 
Although keeping labour costs low is a fundamental characteristic of capitalism, the depreciation 
of care is particularly evident in the case of Germany’s elder care regime where the bulk of elder 
care is still unpaid and provided in private households or delegated to informal workers outside the 
family. What drives the depreciation of care work is not the direct pursuit of profit generation. 
Instead, attempts are made to indirectly protect profits by keeping care costs low. And this in turn 
is realised by the help of limited public budgets: Regarding “sector 1”, driven by the cost pressure 
of low long-term care insurance, a price-cutting competition takes place that results in cutting wages 
and utilising migrants and unskilled care workers for informal care work. This depreciation can also 
be achieved by unpaid elder care work as in the case of family members and volunteers (“sector 
2”).  
By mobilising these groups with the help of state care policy, their labour power can be 
appropriated cheaply compared to the costs of formally employed professionals. Government 
spending on elder care and employers’ contributions to long-term care insurance can thus be kept 
at a comparatively low level. Small providers, who are suffering from cost pressure and a shortage 
of skilled workers, can also save on personnel costs without making profits. Thus, just as unpaid 
domestic work reduces the value of labour power and indirectly increases profits, unpaid and 
underpaid informal elder care work also indirectly increases profits, and contributes to the 
maintenance of a care regime geared towards cost reduction. In addition to the poorly remunerated 
and rationalised care work of formally employed professionals, it represents another effective 




Theoretical Framework: Exclusion, Social Vulnerability and Depreciation  
The indirect exploitation of informal elder care is understood here as the process in which certain 
actors under specific conditions appropriate the depreciated labour efforts of socially vulnerable 
lay care workers to lower reproduction costs. Compared with the costs of formally employed 
professional care workers, this means especially cheap or even for free. According to Wright (1997: 
10), whose definition of exploitation we follow here, exploitation can be defined by the help of 
three criteria. First, the material welfare of exploiters causally depends on the material deprivations 
of the exploited. Second, following “the exclusion principle”, the causal relation involves the 
asymmetrical exclusion of the exploited from access to and control over important productive 
resources. This exclusion may be accompanied by force and oppression but in some cases it may 
not be. Third, the causal mechanism involves the appropriation of the fruits of the labour of the 
exploited by the exploiters.  
According to Marx, expropriation and social power relations play a central role as conditions 
for exploitation. Thus, propertylessness and powerlessness on the part of the exploited mark the 
structural linchpin of their exploitability. But expropriation is a term mostly aimed at the ownership 
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of economic means of production, such as land or machinery (Fraser, 2016: 166), and is thus alone 
not suitable for capturing specific cultural disadvantages associated with sexist or racial 
discrimination. Exclusion, which is widely used in German and French sociology (Dubet and 
Lapeyronnie, 1992), points to fundamental social divisions caused by unemployment, the loss of 
close social relationships and poverty in the Global North. Regarding the groups investigated here 
(especially the unemployed, poverty migrants or poor pensioners), and according to Wright, the 
term exclusion is used here instead of expropriation. However, compared to Wright, who also 
focused only on economic resources, the term is used here more openly regarding economic and 
cultural disadvantages, both of which are relevant to exploitation in highly feminised working 
contexts. Like expropriation, exclusion refers to social subject positions that are characterised by a 
specific lack of resources, but it can also highlight cultural disadvantages.  
Furthermore, exploitation as a hierarchical power relation mainly goes hand in hand with 
oppression but is not identical with it. Oppression is a power-theoretical term essential for 
understanding relationships of exploitation. But in contrast to oppression, the specificity of the 
concept of exploitation lies in the appropriation of labour power (Wright, 1989: 77). To address 
the issue of highly feminised elder care work and to consider those special groups mobilised by 
Germany’s elder care policy, we use a concept of exploitation, aided by the concept of exclusion, 
which acknowledges that “we are dealing with a capitalist mode of … reproduction that entails 
historically specific relations of gender and racial oppression” (McNally, 2017: 111). Because 
exclusion and the related economic and cultural disadvantages mainly result from oppression (as 
specific relations of gender and racial oppression), it should always be considered as oppressive. 
However, as Wright correctly stated, exploitation must be distinguished from “nonexploitative 
oppression”.5 We can make similar observations for the groups under investigation. Volunteers, 
for example, are not oppressed, but rather receive state support. Nevertheless, their involvement 
can be attributed to a lack of social recognition or economic resources, like sufficient pensions or 
wage income, due to their exclusion from the labour market. To sum up, instead of dealing with 
expropriation and oppression, we use the term exclusion as a first condition for exploitation, one 
which is sensitive to various forms of economic and cultural oppression and which emphasises 
dependencies that make certain groups of people economically exploitable.  
The next step from exclusion to exploitation can be taken with the help of the subject-related 
term social vulnerability, which derives from research on informality (Alter Chen, 2013: 152). This is 
the second enabling condition for the exploitation processes examined here. Accordingly, social 
processes of exclusion generate social vulnerability in at least two ways, which can be specifically 
exploited. First, social vulnerability can be caused by material–economic scarcity, due to exclusion 
from access to the possession of assets and means of production, as well as through exclusion from 
wage labour or welfare compensations. Those cases result in material vulnerability, forcing the 
affected persons to make concessions, for instance, by accepting informal jobs. Second, social 
vulnerability is also generated in the cultural–symbolic sphere by discriminatory practices that cause 
exclusion according to gender, race, age and class. Cultural vulnerability also designates the 
condition in which individuals, depreciated by sexist or racist discrimination, are forced to accept 
low pay and informal jobs. The idea of cultural vulnerability acknowledges the central influence of 
multiple oppressions and socio-cultural factors on the constitution and reproduction of exploitative 
 
 
5According to Wright (1997: 11), “the crucial difference … is that, in an exploitative relation, the exploiter 
depends upon the effort of the exploited. In the case of nonexploitative oppression, the oppressors would 
be happy if the oppressed simply disappeared”. 
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relations, particularly as emphasised by social reproduction theory (Bhattacharya, 2017: 3).6  
Last but not least, we need to consider the special situation of the elder care market in 
Germany. In contrast to Marx, exploitation in Germany’s elder care market does not mainly arise 
in the form of productive labour directly creating profits. Instead, many providers depreciate elder 
care work by cutting wages due to the specific cost pressure based on the structure of long-term 
care insurance. Because the limited budgets of the insurance, laid down by the state, also determine 
the level of wages and the purchasing power of private households, the providers and even private 
households rely on especially cheap elder care. This in turn can take the form of the informal and 
often illegal use of paid unskilled assistants as well as in the use of unpaid volunteers or relatives. 
Both forms of state-subsidised informal labour are different from the capitalistically exploited 
formal and “productive” wage labour that Marx had in mind. Neither the illegal use of unskilled 
assistants nor support from volunteers or relatives is aimed at direct profit generation. Instead, 
their use keeps reproduction costs especially low compared to professional elder care. These 
savings contribute indirectly to increasing profits, because they keep employers’ contributions to 
long-term care insurance low. This in turn means, and this will be shown in the following section, 
that very different actors – such as employers and the state, but also small providers and private 
households – are among the beneficiaries of this indirect exploitation. 
To sum up, this concept of indirect exploitation combines Wright’s “exclusion principle” with 
the Marxist–Feminist term depreciation and adds the term social vulnerability. It starts with multiple 
processes of exclusion that in turn lead to material as well as cultural vulnerability. These positions of 
social vulnerability can in turn be exploited with the aim of depreciating elder care work. Social 
vulnerability thus tries to combine exclusion with exploitation to integrate economic and cultural 
disadvantages equally. And depreciation understands that exploitation does not necessarily go hand 
in hand with surplus but can also have a negative value difference. Thus, we now have a concept 
of exploitation that, one, does not depend upon the direct creation of profits, and two, considers 
special social vulnerabilities due to economic and cultural disadvantages in the field of informal 
elder care. To illustrate some core mechanisms as well as the beneficiaries of this indirect 




To analyse the mechanisms of exploitation of informal elder care work, a qualitative interview study 
was carried out from 2014 till 2016 (Haubner, 2017). The decision to undertake this type of study 
derived from the understanding that exploitation is a specific social relation that needs to be 
considered as culturally and socially embedded. Thus, the study did not attempt to be representative 
in a statistical sense. Instead, it aimed to identify the social and cultural mechanisms that structure 
exploitative relationships. Overall, twenty-seven semi-structured interviews were conducted, 
 
 
6 Nancy Fraser (2016: 166) tries in a very similar way to connect the economic logic and political order of 
capitalist societies. With the terms “expropriation” and “political subjectivation” she aims at the exploitation 
of unfree labour and the state-supported devaluation of certain groups of people. “Expropriation” refers to 
material aspects, specifically confiscated assets such as land, labour or energy deposits. To integrate racial 
discrimination, Fraser adds the term “political subjectivation”. However, instead of analytically separating 
“free subjects of exploitation” from “dependent subjects of expropriation” (Fraser, 2016: 169), the term 
exploitation is used here for both paid and unpaid informal care work. The term social vulnerability also 
encompasses economically, politically and culturally inferior subject positions. 
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mostly in the eastern parts of Germany. The interviewees comprised four groups – female relatives; 
volunteers; low-skilled “additional personal assistants”; and migrant care workers. Expert 
interviews were also carried out with nursing science experts, employees of the German Federal 
Employment Agency, and management from private and public nursing homes. Using theoretical 
sampling, the expert interviews and the interviews with informal elder care workers were evaluated 
separately with the help of MAXQDA 10. The two interview types were also triangulated to allow 
for different perspectives on the exploitation of  elder care by those who exploited it (some of  the 
experts) and those who actually did informal elder care work (family members, volunteers, migrant 
domestic workers and unskilled care workers). Finally, analyses of  social reporting as well as 
representative studies on Germany’s elder care regime were added to the investigation.  
 
 
Study Results  
 
Intertwined vulnerabilities  
The question of who is exploited in the informal areas of Germany’s elder care market and for 
what reasons can be answered with regard to the social vulnerabilities of the four study groups. 
Not uncoincidentally, socio-political support for unskilled and informal elder care work focuses on 
those mostly female parts of the population that are socially vulnerable due to processes of 
exclusion because of material–economic scarcity and discrimination practices. Almost all the 
interviewees of the four groups in our sample are socially vulnerable due to a lack of material 
resources. They are also mostly women who are considered “naturally” capable of caring for others 
without needing proper qualifications or payment.  
Regarding the first group, relatives, the empirical findings from interviews with three female 
relatives show that the family-based elder care regime is not only rooted in the elders’ desire for 
care by their own families but in the social vulnerability of the mostly female main caregivers. 
Regarding the aforementioned material vulnerabilities, female relatives provide most of the 
informal elder care because of low insurance benefits and insufficient professional care services. 
Because long-term care insurance only covers about half of the care costs incurred, relatives have 
always been forced to perform a large part of unpaid care work. Facing the alternatives – to use 
the help of an outpatient service, which carries out only the most necessary tasks at small intervals 
due to low insurance benefits, or to do the bulk of care work oneself only with the help of very 
low benefits (which are merely supplementary benefits and not wages) – the majority of relatives 
decide to receive the lowest cash-for-care benefits and take on sole care responsibilities. Thus, 
inadequate insurance benefits and low household incomes, which limit the purchase of professional 
care services, interact with each other. Cultural vulnerability also plays a role when wives, daughters 
or stepdaughters assume, on their own, overstraining care responsibilities due to both learned and 
ascribed care competence and family obligations. And they pay a high price: Up to 70 per cent of 
caring relatives (and that means mostly women) suffer from depression due to their care obligations 
(Deufert, 2013: 521). Germany’s care regime is thus able to make strategic use of these ascriptive 
and internalised role attributions of female relatives. By forcing them to provide the bulk of home 
elder care alone and to risk poverty, reproductive costs can be reduced to ease the burden on the 
state budget and employers.  
To provide incentives for the second group, volunteers, the state offers hourly compensation 
payments and training with the help of long-term care insurance benefits. The sample of three 
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volunteer “dementia assistants” and the head of a volunteer agency shows that monetarised 
volunteer care work is now a small player in the elder care market, competing with outpatient 
services. It is also increasingly attractive for those with low incomes and is used as an additional 
source of income for female pensioners affected by poverty in old age. Material and cultural 
vulnerabilities come into play when volunteer work is used by the unemployed or working poor to 
earn some extra cash, to improve their employability, and to tackle the stigma of unemployment 
and poverty. In addition, volunteer work in the field of elder care is seen as “women’s work”, where 
predominantly older and retired women are involved due to gender-specific divisions of care work. 
The help of volunteers is taken up by private households that wish to relieve themselves by 
purchasing informal support subsidised by the state. It finally results from the limited financial 
options for many caring relatives who are urgently in need of cost-effective support. 
For the third group, migrant care workers, the example of one Bulgarian care worker and a 
group of nine care workers from different Eastern European countries makes it drastically clear 
that social exclusion can result in social vulnerability, which in turn can give rise to exploitation. 
The specific economic vulnerability of Eastern European care workers derives from 
unemployment, especially for women, and the lack of welfare state protection. These materially 
and culturally vulnerable and often unqualified female migrant care workers end up taking care of 
heavily dependent people, mostly regardless of labour law provisions. Regarding cultural 
vulnerability, their informal care work is not only highly feminised, but also structured by 
discriminatory practices of ethnicisation, which finds symbolic expression in the so-called “24-hour 
Polish care worker”– praised by placement agencies as particularly family-oriented and hard-
working.  
Finally, public workfare programmes recruit formerly long-term unemployed and unskilled 
people to fill the gaps in the shortage of skilled labour. These government-funded jobs are targeted 
at materially and culturally vulnerable individuals who suffer from the stigma of long-term 
unemployment and are willing to make concessions in terms of low wages and unpaid additional 
work. As documented in the sample of three “additional personal assistants”, all fell into long-term 
unemployment and poverty following German reunification and the end of the former socialist 
German Democratic Republic in 1989. Regarding cultural vulnerability, during the interviews with 
the German Federal Employment Agency, it appeared that low-skilled and unemployed women 
tend to be recruited on the grounds of “having a big heart”, which appears to be more important 
for feminised care work than formal qualifications. Although, these “additional personal assistants” 
are only supposed to perform low-threshold care tasks, they are often illegally used in elder care. 
This illegal use results, however, from the need to save money and the shortage of skilled labour 
to which most providers are subject. In many cases, the informal use of care workers is the only 
option to keep the business going.  
 
The cascaded exploitation of lay care work 
Exploitation in Germany’s elder care market occurs when female relatives administer medications 
because of low insurance benefits, when volunteers do housekeeping for an expense allowance, 
when migrant domestic workers do wound care and are available twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week for low cash payments, and when “additional personal assistants” replace elder care 
professionals in nursing homes without being paid like professionals. This indirect exploitation can 
be described as cascaded. The economic dilemma of elder care work, which is indispensable but of 
limited profitability, marks the beginning of the exploitation cascade. This basic economic problem 
is dealt with differently by national elder care regimes, with varying political framework conditions 
which address this economic dilemma in different ways.  
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Germany’s elder care regime is responding to the limited profitability of elder care with a 
specific cost pressure: The limited budgets of long-term care insurance create a structural 
exploitation pressure that is passed on down the chain onto the shoulders of actors with less and 
less scope for choice. Capped insurance rates put an ex ante limit on the available funding volume 
for all insurance benefits. The resulting financial pressure on household incomes and wages in care 
services is passed on to different care providers starting with ambulant and inpatient providers up 
to private households. Due to low care benefits and a lack of skilled workers, the providers 
surveyed have increasing difficulty recruiting professionals. Because of low wages, a lack of skilled 
labour and increasing demand, “additional personal assistants” are informally used and perform 
activities for which they are neither qualified nor paid. A more or less necessary recruitment 
strategy, it is also an exploitation mechanism in which the wage level is lowered through the illegal 
expansion of the work spectrum. However, this form of indirect exploitation is not aimed at 
generating profits. Rather, it aims at a specific depreciation of elder care work that in turn primarily 
results from limited financial volume. The profiteers of this exploitation benefit in very different 
ways: While the small care providers are only able to maintain their businesses despite financial 
bottlenecks, the big winners include the state and capital, who are not forced to respond to rising 
care costs by raising contribution rates and wages.  
Regarding migrant care workers, even more exploitative instances come into play. It is not 
only private agencies that benefit from what is slavery-like exploitation. State and capital can also 
keep reproduction costs low with the illegal use of their labour, which sanctions neither exceeding 
competences nor working hours. Finally, private households are only able to purchase 
comprehensive home care by utilising the cheap or even free help of socially vulnerable relatives, 
volunteers or informally working migrant care workers. In the face of low insurance benefits, the 
households take advantage of the fact that lay care workers give injections, dress wounds, 
administer medication or keep house on the basis of expense allowances or low insurance benefits. 
Thus, private households must also be regarded as exploitative institutions, although their choice 
is often born of necessity. Finally, the thesis of an exploitation relation is also strengthened by the 
empirical finding of a transgression of qualifications, when lay care workers carry out care activities 
for which they are not qualified or paid. For example, the local success of a volunteer agency, 
whose volunteers informally provide wound care and domestic services during their missions, is 





The socio-political expansion of informal elder care work in Germany has been examined here in 
terms of exploitation. The notions of exclusion and social vulnerability were used to answer the 
question why mainly women from special population groups are targeted by German care policy. 
In addition, the notion of depreciation has been used to sketch a nationally specific cascade of 
indirect exploitation dynamics which primarily occur due to state-driven cost pressure that in turn 
aims at keeping reproduction costs low. In doing so, the concept of exploitation is opened up to 
informal care work. Also, insights are gained into grey areas of the German elder care market that 
have not been much researched. Using the notion of indirect exploitation and giving equal 
consideration to economic and cultural mechanisms of exploitation, the cases examined here have 
tried to show that exploitation in ageing capitalist societies need not necessarily exist only in formal 
employment and due to the direct generation of profits. Instead, unpaid and underpaid informal 
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care work is a constitutive element of a capitalist “work transfer”, in which the depreciation of 
elder care work elsewhere expands the scope for economic action. “In health care”, in other words, 
“the financial saving of shifting work to patients and their families is not reflected in reduced out-
of-pocket costs but in reduced costs to business and the federal government” (Glazer, 1993: 14). 
The use of informal lay care work is thus not a pre-capitalist remnant or merely a result of 
incomplete markets. Instead, it is actively politically promoted and used economically. One could 
of course also speak of a state-driven informalisation and deprofessionalisation of elder care. 
However, this would neglect the causal nexus we can observe here. To speak of exploitation means 
that state- and especially capital-run interests are taking advantage of socially vulnerable population 
groups for the purpose of lower reproduction costs. Because elder care is only marginally profitable 
but increasingly demanded, this exploitation reveals a structurally determined, yet actively pursued 
political strategy of labour utilisation that indirectly increases profits from certain actors’ social 
vulnerability. Finally, this investigation widens the scope of struggles in the workplace to those 
hidden areas of care work that have long been ignored. Thus, it also allows research on exploitation 
processes in other fields of care services. The use of volunteers, as currently promoted by social 
policy in Germany, can also be analysed in terms of exploitation in the areas of family support, all-
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